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Abstract
In a normative environment an agent’s actions are
not only directed by its goals but also by the norms
imposed on it. However, the potential conflicts
within and between the agent’s goals and norms
makes decision-making in these frameworks a chal-
lenging task. The questions we address in this pa-
per are: (i) how should an agent act in a normative
environment? (ii) how can the agent explain why
it acted in a certain way? We propose a solution in
which a normative planning problem serves as the
basis for a practical reasoning approach based on
argumentation. The properties of the best plan(s)
with respect to goal achievement and norm compli-
ance are mapped to arguments that are used to ex-
plain why a plan is justified, using an existing proof
dialogue game.
1 Introduction
Autonomous agents operating in a dynamic environment
must be able to reason about actions in pursuit of their goals.
An additional consideration for such agents are the regulative
norms imposed on them that define what an agent is obliged
or forbidden to do. To avoid punishment, agents must comply
with norms while pursuing their goals. However, if comply-
ing with a norm hinders a more important goal or norm, the
agent should consider violating it. In order to make a decision
about what to do, an agent therefore needs to generate all pos-
sible courses of actions (i.e. plans) and weigh up the impor-
tance of goal achievement and norm compliance against the
cost of goals being ignored and norms being violated, in dif-
ferent plans. Although practical reasoning frameworks that
take norms into account exist (e.g., [Broersen et al., 2001;
Kollingbaum and Norman, 2003]), little attention has been
paid to the explanation of the agents’ decision making in such
frameworks. Such explanation is important in several con-
texts, including human-agent teams and debugging agents.
To address this shortcoming, we therefore propose conduct-
ing practical reasoning using argumentation.
Argumentation is a discipline that has dealt with issues
of handling inconsistency and decision-making [Dung, 1995;
Amgoud and Prade, 2009] for a long time. In addition,
the dialogical aspect of argumentation makes it an appropri-
ate tool to generate explanation for a decision made using
this technique (e.g. [Fan and Toni, 2015; Caminada et al.,
2014b]). Although argumentation has been extensively used
in practical reasoning (e.g., [Rahwan and Amgoud, 2006;
Atkinson and Bench-Capon, 2007]), integrating the reasoning
and dialogical aspect of argumentation for decision-making
and its explanation is not addressed in existing approaches.
In this paper we propose an argumentation-based approach
to normative practical reasoning that uses dialogue games to
provide an intuitive overview of agent’s reasoning. In achiev-
ing this aim, the following contributions are made: (i) we for-
malise a set of argument schemes and critical questions [Wal-
ton, 1996] that aim at checking the justifiability of plans with
respect to goal satisfaction and norm compliance/violation;
(ii) we offer a novel decision criterion that identifies the best
plan(s) both in presence and absence of preferences over
goals and norms; and (iii) we investigate the properties of
the best plan(s) and propose a concrete application for the re-
cently developed preferred dialogue games [Caminada et al.,
2014a] that uses these properties to generate an explanation
for the justifiability of the best plan(s).
2 Model
This section introduces a model for normative practical rea-
soning based on STRIPS planning [Fikes and Nilsson, 1971].
Definition 1 (Normative Planning Problem). A normative
planning problem is a tuple P = 〈FL, ∆, A,G,N〉 where
FL is a set of fluents; ∆ ⊆ FL is the initial state; A is a finite,
non-empty set of durative actions; G is the set of agent goals;
N is a set of action-based norms imposed on the agent.
Fluents FL is a set of domain fluents. A literal l is a flu-
ent or its negation. For a set of literals L, we define L+ =
{fl s.t. fl ∈ L} and L− = {fl s.t. ¬fl ∈ L}. L is well-
defined if L+ ∩ L− = ∅. A state s ⊆ FL is determined by
those fluents true at a given time, other fluents are considered
false. A state s satisfies literal fl, denoted as s |= fl, if fl ∈ s,
and satisfies literal ¬fl, denoted s |= ¬fl, if fl 6∈ s.
Actions An action a = 〈pr, ps, d〉 is composed of well-
defined sets of literals pr(a), ps(a) that represent a’s pre-
and postconditions and a number d(a) ∈ N representing the
action’s duration. Postconditions are divided into a set of
add postconditions ps(a)+ and a set of delete postconditions
ps(a)−. An action a can be executed in a state s if its pre-
conditions hold in that state. The postconditions of a durative
action are applied in the state s at which the action ends, by
adding the positive postconditions belonging to ps(a)+ and
deleting the negative postconditions belonging to ps(a)−.
Goals Achievement goals need to instantaneously achieve a
certain state of affairs. Each g ∈ G is a well-defined set
of literals g = {r1, · · · , rn}, known as goal requirements
(denoted as ri), that should hold in order to satisfy the goal.
Norms An action-based norm is defined as a tuple n =
〈d o, acon, asub, dl〉, where d o ∈ {o, f} is the deontic op-
erator denoting obligation or prohibition; acon ∈ A is the
action that activates the norm; asub ∈ A is the action that is
the subject of the obligation or prohibition; and dl ∈ N is the
norm deadline relative to the completion of the execution of
the action acon, that is the activation condition of the norm.
2.1 Semantics
Let P = 〈FL,∆, A,G,N〉 be a normative plan-
ning problem as described previously. Also let pi =
〈(a0, 0), · · · , (an, tan)〉 with ai ∈ A and tai ∈ Z+ be a se-
quence of actions ai executed at time tai s.t. ∀i < j, tai <
taj . The total duration of a sequence of actions is calculated
as follows: Makespan(pi) = max(tai + d(ai)). The exe-
cution of a sequence of actions from a given starting state
s0 = ∆ brings about a sequence of states S(pi) = 〈s0, · · · sm〉
for every discrete time interval from 0 to m, where m =
Makespan(pi). The transition relation between two states is
given in Equation (1) below. If an action ai ends at time k,
state sk results from removing all delete postconditions and
adding all add postconditions of action ai to state sk−1. Thus,
∀ 0 < k ≤ m :
sk =
{
(sk−1 \ ps(ai)−) ∪ ps(ai)+ k = tai + d(ai)
sk−1 otherwise
(1)
pi satisfies a goal: if there is a state that satisfies the goal:
pi |= g iff ∃ sk ∈ S(pi) s.t. sk |= g. The set of satisfied goals
by pi is denoted as Gpi .
pi complies with an obligation: if the action that is the
subject of the obligation, asub, occurs during the compliance
period (i.e. between when the condition holds and when the
deadline expires):
pi |= n iff (acon, tacon), (asub, tasub) ∈ pi s.t.
tasub ∈ [tacon + d(acon), dl + tacon + d(acon))
If asub does not occur during the compliance period, the
obligation is violated: pi 6|= n.
pi complies with a prohibition: if the prohibition’s subject
action asub does not occur during the compliance period:
pi |= n iff (acon, tacon) ∈ pi, 6 ∃(asub, tasub) ∈ pi s.t.
tasub ∈ [tacon + d(acon), dl + tacon + d(acon))
If asub occurs during the compliance period, the prohibition
norm is violated: pi 6|= n.
We assume that the norm deadlines end before m =
Makespan(pi). Therefore, all the activated norms in pi, de-
noted as Npi , are either complied with or violated by time m.
2.2 Conflict
In this section different types of conflicts are discussed; and
it is defined which sequence of actions are identified as a plan
w.r.t these conflicts. We consider a running example where
an agent has the goals of going on strike, submitting a report
and getting a certificate of some sort. However, if the agent
goes on maternity leave, it cannot go to the office and submit
the report. Moreover, if the agent goes on strike, it cannot go
to office or attend any meeting.
Definition 2 (Conflicting Actions). Actions ai and aj have
a concurrency conflict iff the preconditions or postconditions
of ai contradict the preconditions or postconditions of aj .
cf action = {(ai, aj) s.t. ∃r ∈ pr(ai) ∪ ps(ai),
¬r ∈ pr(aj) ∪ ps(aj)}
Definition 3 (Conflicting Goals). Goal gi and gj are trivially
in conflict iff satisfying them requires bringing about conflict-
ing state of affairs.
cf goal = {(gi, gj) s.t. ∃r ∈ gi,¬r ∈ gj}
Example 1. strike = {union member, ¬at office,
¬meeting attended} and submission = {at office,
report finalised} are conflicting.
Definition 4 (Conflicting Obligations and Goals). n = 〈o,
acon, asub, dl〉 and g are trivially in conflict, if executing ac-
tion asub that is the subject of the obligation, brings about
postconditions that are in conflict with the requirements of g.
cf goalobl = {(g, n) s.t. ∃r ∈ g,¬r ∈ ps(asub)}
Example 2. strike and n1 = 〈o, get company funding ,
attend meeting, 2〉, where the agent is obliged to attend
a meeting on behalf of the company if it uses the com-
pany funding, are in conflict, since the postconditions of
attend meeting prevents the agent from going on strike.
Definition 5 (Conflicting Prohibitions and Goals). A prohibi-
tion norm n = 〈f, acon, asub, dl〉 and a goal g are trivially in
conflict, if the postconditions of asub contribute to satisfying
g, but executing action asub is prohibited by norm n.
cf goalpro = {(g, n) s.t. ∃r ∈ g, r ∈ ps(asub)}
Example 3. submission = {at office, report finalised}
and n2 = 〈f, take maternity leave, go to office, 6〉 are in
conflict since taking maternity leave prevents the agent from
going to the office and hence prevents fulfilling the goal of
submission: (submission, n2) ∈ cf goalnorm.
The entire set of conflicting goals and norms is defined as:
cf goalnorm = cf goalobl ∪ cf goalpro.
Definition 6 (Conflicting Obligations). n1 = 〈o, acon, asub,
dl〉 and n2 = 〈o, bcon, bsub, dl′〉 are in conflict in the context
of pi if the obliged actions in n1, i.e. asub, and n2, i.e. bsub
have a concurrency conflict; and action asub is in progress
during the entire period over which the agent is obliged to
execute action bsub.
cfpioblobl = {(n1, n2) s.t. (acon, tacon), (bcon, tbcon) ∈ pi;
(acon, bsub) ∈ cf action;
tasub ∈ [tacon + d(acon), tacon + d(acon) + dl);
[tbcon+d(bcon), tbcon+d(bcon)+dl
′) ⊆ [tasub , tasub+d(asub))}
Example 4. Due to the concurrency conflict between ac-
tions attend meeting and attend interview, in n1 =
〈o, get company funding , attend meeting, 2〉 and n4 =
〈o, take theory test, attend interview, 2〉 and depending
on the way actions are sequenced in a plan, it is possible that
in some pi: (n1, n4) ∈ cf pioblobl.
Definition 7 (Conflicting Obligations and Prohibitions). An
obligation n1 = 〈o, acon, asub, dl〉 and a prohibition n2 =
〈f, bcon, asub, dl′〉 are in conflict in the context of pi if n2 for-
bids the agent to execute action asub during the entire period
over which obligation n1 obliges the agent to take asub.
cf pioblpro = {(n1, n2) s.t. (acon, tacon), (bcon, tbcon) ∈ pi;
[tacon + d(acon), tacon + d(acon) + dl) ⊆
[tbcon + d(bcon), tbcon + d(bcon) + dl
′)}
Example 5. The obligation to, and a pro-
hibition from attend meeting in n1 =
〈o, get company funding , attend meeting, 2〉 and
n3 = 〈f, take maternity leave, attend meeting, 6〉 can
cause a normative conflict in some pi: (n1, n3) ∈ cf pioblpro.
All together, two sets cf pioblobl and cf
pi
oblpro constitute the
set of conflicting norms: cf pinorm = cf
pi
oblobl ∪ cf pioblpro.
Definition 8 (Plan). A sequence of actions pi = 〈(a0, 0), · · · ,
(an, tan)〉 is a plan for the normative planning problem P =
(FL,∆, A,G,N) iff the following conditions hold:
• The fluents in ∆ (and nothing else) hold in the initial
state: s0 = ∆
• the preconditions of action ai holds at time tai and
throughout the execution of ai:
∀k ∈ [tai , tai + d(ai)), sk |= pr(ai)• the set of goals satisfied by plan pi is a non-empty (Gpi 6=
∅) consistent subset of goals:
Gpi ⊆ G and 6 ∃gi, gj ∈ Gpi s.t. (gi, gj) ∈ cf goal• there is no concurrency conflict between actions that are
executed concurrently:
6 ∃(ai, tai), (aj , taj ) ∈ pi s.t.
tai ≤ taj < tai + d(ai), (ai, aj) ∈ cf action• there is no conflict between norms complied with.
6 ∃ni, nj ∈ Ncmp(pi) s.t. (ni, nj) ∈ cf pinorm• there is no conflict between goals satisfied and norms
complied with:
6 ∃g ∈ Gpi and n ∈ Ncmp(pi) s.t. (g, n) ∈ cf goalnorm
Having defined the set of plans, Π, in the next section we
deal with the issue of choosing the best plan.
3 Identifying the Best Plan
The conflict between agent’s goals and norms often makes
it impossible for the agent to satisfy all its goals while com-
plying with all norms triggered in a plan. In this section we
show how to treat each plan as a proposal of actions and how
to use argumentation schemes to check the justifiability of a
plan proposal with respect to conflicts and preferences, as a
step toward identifying the best plan(s) in Section 3.2.
3.1 Argumentation Framework
An argumentation framework (AF) consists of a set of ar-
guments and attacks between them [Dung, 1995]: AF =
〈Arg , Att〉, Att ⊆ Arg × Arg . In scheme-based ap-
proaches [Walton, 1996] arguments are expressed in natural
language and a set of critical questions is associated with each
scheme, identifying how the scheme can be attacked. Below,
we introduce a set of argument schemes and critical ques-
tions to reason about a plan proposal w.r.t. goals it satisfies
and norms it complies with or violates.
Definition 9 (Plan ArgumentArgpi). A plan argument claims
that the agent should execute a proposed sequence of actions
because that leads to satisfying a set of goals, and complying
with a set of norms, although it violates some norms:
- In the initial state ∆
- The agent should execute sequence of actions pi
- Which will satisfy set of goalsGpi and complies with set
of norms Ncmp(pi) and violates set of norms Nvol(pi)
Definition 10 (Goal Argument Argg). A goal argument
claims that a feasible goal should be satisfied:
- Goal g is a feasible 1 goal of the agent
- Therefore, satisfying g is required
The set of goal argument is denoted as ArgG.
Definition 11 (Norm Argument Argn). A norm argument
claims that an activated norm should be complied with:
- n is an activated norm imposed on the agent in plan pi
- Therefore, complying with n is required in pi
The set of norm argument for a plan is denoted as ArgNpi .
Critical Questions Associated with Plan Scheme
CQ1: Is there any attack from a goal argument toArgpi? This
CQ results in an undercut attack (asymmetric by nature)
from a goal argument to a plan argument, when the goal
is not satisfied in the plan:
∀Argg ∈ ArgG if pi 6|= g then (Argg, Argpi) ∈ Att
CQ2: Is there any attack from a norm argument to Argpi?
This CQ results in an undercut from a norm argument to
a plan argument, when the norm is violated in the plan:
∀Argn ∈ ArgNpi if pi 6|= n then (Argn, Argpi) ∈ Att
Critical Questions Associated with Goal Scheme
CQ3: What goal arguments might attack Argg? This CQ re-
sults in a rebut attack (symmetric by definition) between
arguments for conflicting goals:
∀Argg, Argg′ ∈ ArgG
if (g, g′) ∈ cf goal then (Argg, Argg′) ∈ Att
CQ4: What norm arguments might attack Argg? This CQ
results in a rebut attack between arguments for a goal
and a norm that are in conflict:
∀Argg ∈ ArgG, Argn ∈ ArgNpi
if (g, n) ∈ cf goalnorm then (Argg, Argn) ∈ Att
Critical Questions Associated with Norm Scheme
CQ4: What goal arguments might attack the norm presented
by Argn? The previous critical question, is associ-
ated with argument schemes for norms as well as goals,
hence the repetition of the number of critical question.
∀Argg ∈ ArgG, Argn ∈ ArgNpi
if (n, g) ∈ cf goalnorm then (Argn, Argg) ∈ Att
1A goal is feasible if there is at least one plan that satisfies it.
CQ5: What norm arguments might attack the norm presented
by Argn? Conflict between two norms is defined as a
contextual conflict that depends upon the context of the
plan in which the norms are activated.
∀Argn, Argn′ ∈ ArgNpi
if (n, n′) ∈ cfpinorm then (Argn, Argn′) ∈ Att
Preferences between arguments distinguish an attack from
a defeat (i.e., a successful attack [Amgoud and Cayrol,
2002]). The attack from one argument to another is a de-
feat if the latter argument is not preferred over the former.
However, as discussed in [Prakken, 2012], rebuttal attacks
are preference-dependent, whereas undercuts are preference-
independent. Thus, attacks due to CQ3, CQ4 and CQ5 need
preferences to be resolved, while attacks caused by CQ1 and
CQ2 are preference independent, always resulting in defeat.
We define gn as a partial preorder on G ∪ N . Symbol
gn denotes the strict relation corresponding to gn. Also,
(α, β) ∈ ∼gn iff (α, β) ∈ gn and (β, α) ∈ gn. The pref-
erences between the goal and norm arguments result from the
preference relation between these entities: (Argα, Argβ) ∈
 iff (α, β) ∈ gn.
An AF for a plan proposal consists of the argument for
the plan itself, a set of arguments for goals and arguments
for norms that are activated in that plan. Although the set of
goal arguments in AFs for plan proposals remain the same
across the AFs, the set of norm arguments differs from one to
another depending on the norms that are activated in each.
Definition 12 (Plan Proposal AF). The AF for plan proposal
pi is AFpi = 〈Arg ,Def 〉, where Arg = Argpi∪ArgG∪ArgNpi
and Def is defined as: ∀Argα,Argβ ∈ Arg , (Argα,Argβ) ∈
Def iff (Argα,Argβ) ∈ AttCQ1−5 and (Argβ ,Argα) 6∈.
The next section explains how an AF for a plan proposal is
evaluated and used toward identifying the best plan(s).
3.2 Evaluating the Argumentation Framework
Argumentation semantics are a means for evaluating argu-
ments in an AF and various semantics have been introduced
since the proposal of Dung’s AF [Dung, 1995]. Among these
semantics credulous preferred is repeatedly proposed [Cami-
nada, 2006; Prakken, 2006; Oren, 2013] to reason about and
toward actions. Caminada [2006] provides an intuitive way
to identify the status of arguments w.r.t. various semantics
through labellings. Here, an argument is respectively, la-
belled in, out and undec, if it is acceptable, rejected and
undecided under a certain semantics. In a complete labelling,
an argument is labelled in iff all its attackers are labelled out,
and the argument is labelled out iff there exists an attacker for
it that is labelled in. A complete labelling in which the set of
arguments labelled in are maximal (w.r.t. set inclusion) is
a preferred labelling. Intuitively, an argument is credulously
accepted under preferred semantics if it is labelled in by at
least one preferred labelling.
Definition 13 (Justified Plans). Plan pi is justified if Argpi
is labelled in by at least one preferred labelling for AFpi:
∃ Lpr s.t. Argpi ∈ in(L).
Although all justified plans are internally consistent, they
can still be disagreed with externally for different reasons.
That is, there might be further criteria to take into account
when identifying the best plan among justified plans. We de-
fine the criteria for the best plan(s) using an established set or-
dering principle in argumentation, the Democratic principle:
(Si, Sj) ∈ D iff ∀β ∈ Sj \ Si,∃α ∈ Si \ Sj s.t. (α, β) ∈ .
Since the preferences over goals and norms is partial, com-
paring two plans based on the set of goals and norms is not
always possible. Therefore, absent such preference infor-
mation, the best plan(s) satisfies most goals while violating
fewest norms. We start by defining the goal-dominant and
norm-dominant plans, based on which a better than relation
between plans is defined.
Definition 14 (Goal-dominance). Plan pii goal-dominates pij
denoted as (pii, pij) ∈ ≥G if:
1. (Gpii , Gpij ) ∈ BG; else:
2. |Gpii | ≥ |Gpij |.
Definition 15 (Norm-dominance). Plan pii norm-dominates
pij denoted as (pii, pij) ∈ ≥N if:
1. (Nvol(pii), Nvol(pij)) ∈ BN ; else:
2. |Nvol(pii)| ≥ |Nvol(pij)|.
It is straightforward to show that≥G and≥N are total pre-
orders on a set of plans Π.
Definition 16 (Plan Comparison). Plan pii is better than pij ,
denoted (pii, pij) ∈ >pi , iff:
1. pii is justified and pij is not; or
2. pii and pij are both justified and (pii, pij) ∈ >G; or
3. pii and pij are both justified and and (pii, pij) ∈ ∼G but
(pij , pii) ∈ >N .
Plan pii is as good as pij , denoted (pii, pij) ∈ ∼pi , iff (pii, pij) 6∈
>pi and (pij , pii) 6∈ >pi .
The relation >pi is irreflexive, asymmetric and transitive,
while ∼pi is an equivalence relation on Π.
Definition 17 (Equivalence Classes). Given pi ∈ Π, let
[pii] denote the equivalence class to which pii belongs.
([pii], [pij ]) ∈ ≥ iff (pii, pij) ∈ >pi or (pii, pij) ∈ ∼pi .
Definition 18 (Best Plan(s)). Plan pii is (one of) the best
plan(s) for the agent to execute iff
• pii is justified, and
• 6 ∃pij such that ([pij ], [pii]) ∈ ≥.
Example 6. Assume an agent with three goals
strike, submission (Example 1), and certificate =
{course fee paid, theory test done, interviewed} and
four norms n1, n2, n3, and n4 (Examples 2, 3, 4, and 5). The
agent prefers satisfying goal submission to complying with
norm n2: submission  n2, also it prefers complying with
n4 rather than n1: n4  n1. Let pi1, pi2, pi3, pi4 ∈ Π:
• pi1 |= submission, Nactive(pi1) = {n1}, pi1 |= n1
• pi2 |= submission, certificate, Nactive(pi2) = {n1, n4},
pi2 |= n4, pi2 6|= n1
• pi3 |= submission, certificate, Nactive(pi3) = {n1, n2,
n3, n4}, pi3 |= n3, n4, pi3 6|= n1, n2
• pi4 |= strike, certificate, Nactive(pi4) = {n1, n2, n3,
n4}, pi4 |= n2, n3, n4, pi4 6|= n1.
Figure 1 displays the argumentation graph associated with
each of these plans 2. Plan pi1 is not justified, whereas pi2, pi3
and pi4 all are. Thus, the first condition in Definition 18 holds
for the last three plans. Since the preferences provided over
goals and norms is minimal, in this example the number of
goals satisfied and norms violated determines the best plans
as follows: although |Gpi2 | = |Gpi3 | = |Gpi4 |, |Nvol(pi2)| =
|Nvol(pi4)| < |Nvol(pi3)|. Therefore, pi2  pi3, pi4  pi3, and
pi2 ∼ pi4, which makes pi2 and pi4 the best plans.
3.3 Properties
First, we confirm the satisfaction of rationality postu-
lates [Caminada and Amgoud, 2007]. Second, we investigate
the properties of the best plan(s) and the preferred extensions
that include it.
Property 1. Closure: The conclusions of any extension (in
labelled arguments) are closed under strict rules.
Proof. Plan, goal and norm arguments are built based on de-
feasible rules (schemes). With no strict rules the property
follows immediately.
Property 2. Direct Consistency: The conclusions of any ex-
tension are consistent.
Proof. Suppose the conclusions of the extensionE are incon-
sistent, i.e., there are arguments Argα, Argβ ∈ E such that:
- Argα’s conclusion requires executing plan pi and Argβ’s
conclusion requires satisfying goal g/complying with norm
n, while g is not satisfied/n is violated in pi. Thus, Argβ de-
featsArgα; E is not conflict-free and cannot be an extension.
- Argα’s conclusion requires satisfying goal g/complying
with norm n and Argβ’s conclusion requires satisfying goal
g/complying with norm n′, while g/n and g′/n′ are incon-
sistent. Thus, Argα attacks Argβ and vice versa. Due to the
preferences, at least one of these attacks is identified as defeat
and therefore E is not conflict-free and not an extension.
Property 3. Indirect Consistency: The closure under strict
rules of the conclusions of any extension is consistent.
Proof. With no strict rules the property follows immediately.
Property 4. If a plan argument is labelled in by preferred
labelling L, the arguments representing all the goals that it
does not satisfy and norms it violates are labelled out by L
and vice versa:
Argpi ∈ in(L)⇔ Argg∈G\Gpi ∪Argn∈Nvol(pi) ⊆ out(L).
Proof. Every preferred labelling is a complete labelling. An
argument is labelled in by a complete labelling iff all its at-
tackers are labelled out. Therefore, a plan argument is la-
belled in by a preferred labelling iff all its attackers, namely
the arguments for goals that it does not satisfy and norms that
it violates, are labelled out by that labelling.
Property 5. If a plan argument is labelled in by preferred
labelling L, the arguments representing all the goals that it
satisfies and norms it complies with are also labelled in:
Argpi ∈ in(L)⇒ Argg∈Gpi ∪ArgNcmp(pi) ⊆ in(L).
2st, sub and cer in these figures stand for strike, submission
and certificate , respectively.
Proof. Since Argpi ∈ in(L), from Property 4 we know
that Argg∈G\Gpi ∪ Argn∈Nvol(pi) ⊆ out(L). We also know
from the definition of a plan that Argg∈Gpi ∪ Argn∈Ncmp(pi)
is conflict free. Since all possible attackers of Argg∈Gpi ∪
Argn∈Ncmp(pi) belong to Argg∈G\Gpi ∪ Argn∈Nvol(pi) and
Argg∈G\Gpi ∪Argn∈Nvol(pi) are all labelled out, we conclude
that Argg∈Gpi ∪Argn∈Ncmp(pi) ⊆ in(L).
Note that from Argg∈Gpi ∪ Argn∈Ncmp(pi) ⊆ in(L) one
cannot conclude that Argpi ∈ in(L), as there might be justi-
fied goals or norms not satisfied/complied with in the plan.
Property 6. There is no more than one preferred labelling in
which Argpi ∈ in(L).
Proof. From Property 4 and 5 we know that ifArgpi ∈ in(L)
then Argg∈G\Gpi ∪ Argn∈Nvol(pi) ⊆ out(L) and Argg∈Gpi ∪
Argn∈Ncmp(pi) ⊆ in(L). Since every preferred labelling is a
complete labelling and the following property holds for com-
plete labellings: if out(Lcmp1) = out(Lcmp2) then Lcmp1 =
Lcmp2; we conclude that there is no more than one preferred
labelling in which Argpi ∈ in(L).
Property 7. If Argpi ∈ in(L), L is a stable labelling.
Proof. In Property 4 we showed that if Argpi ∈ in(L)
then Argg∈G\Gpi ∪ Argn∈Nvol(pi) ⊆ out(L) and Argg∈Gpi ∪
Argn∈Ncmp(pi) ⊆ in(L), which makes the undec(L) = ∅. A
preferred labelling with undec(L) = ∅ is a stable labelling.
Therefore, L is a stable labelling.
Property 8. Letgn be a total preorder onG∪N and there-
fore  be a total preorder on goal and norm arguments. If
Argpi ∈ in(L), and the set of arguments for the most pre-
ferred goals and norms, Pref (Arg), is conflict free, all argu-
ments belong to Pref (Arg) are labelled in by L.
Proof. Elements of set Pref (Arg) cannot be defeated, since
the set itself is conflict-free and the rest of arguments belong
to Arg \ Pref (Arg) cannot defeat elements of Pref (Arg),
since that implies an attack from a less preferred argument to
a more preferred one has resulted in a defeat, which is con-
trary to assumption. Assume that ∃Argα ∈ Pref (Arg) such
that Argα 6∈ in(L). If 6 ∃Argβ ∈ in(L) s.t. (Argα, Argβ) ∈
Def then Argα should have been labelled in by L otherwise
it is contrary to the assumption of maximality of preferred la-
bellings. If ∃Argβ ∈ in(L) s.t. (Argα, Argβ) ∈ Def then
∃Argγ ∈ in(L) s.t. (Argγ , Argα) ∈ Def , which is contra-
dictory to the fact that Argα cannot be defeated. Therefore,
all elements of Pref (Arg) are labelled in by in(L).
4 Explaining the Justifiability of the Best Plan
In this section we exploit an existing dialogue for preferred
semantics known as Socratic Discussion [Caminada et al.,
2014a] to provide an explanation for the justifiability of the
best plan(s). Deciding if an argument is in at least one pre-
ferred extension amounts to deciding if it is at least in one
admissible extension (i.e. it is labelled in by at least one ad-
missible labelling). In an admissible labelling if an argument
is labelled in, all attackers are labelled out, and if an argu-





















Figure 1: Argumentation Graph for Plans pi1, pi2, pi3, pi4
Definition 19 (Socratic Discussion [Caminada et al., 2014a]).
Let AF = 〈Arg,Def 〉. The sequence of moves [∆1,∆2,
· · · ,∆n] (n ≥ 1) is a Socratic discussion iff: (i) each odd
move (M-move) is an argument labelled in; (ii) each even
move (S-move) is an argument labelled out; (iii) each argu-
ment moved by S attacks an argument moved by M earlier
in the dialogue; (iv) each argument moved by M attacks an
argument moved by S in the previous step; (v) S-moves can-
not be repeated. Player S wins the discussion if there is an
M-move and an S-move containing the same argument. Oth-
erwise, the winner is the player that makes the last move.
Given that the agent’s best plans(s) pi is labelled in by at
least one preferred labelling, player M is guaranteed a win-
ning strategy in a Socratic discussion with ∆1 = in(Argpi).
The even moves in the rest of dialogue are arguments labelled
out, which according to Property 4 are goals not satisfied or
norms violated in pi. On the other hand, the rest of odd moves
in the dialogue are arguments labelled in, which according to
Property 5 are goals satisfied or norms complied with in pi.
Since each odd move attacks the even move in the previous
step, during a dialogue the agent is able dialectically to ex-
plain why it did not satisfy a goal or violate a norm, which
are the two causes of attacks to the plan proposals.
Example 7. This example shows a Socratic discussion ∆ =
[in(Argpi4), out(Argsub), in(Argst), out(Argn1), in(Argn4)]
for plan pi4.
- M: Plan pi4 is (one of) the best plan(s) and is justifiable.
- S: Why does the plan not satisfy goal submission?
- M: Because the plan satisfies goal strike that attacks goal
submission.
- S: Why does the plan violate norm n1?
- M: Because the plan satisfies norm n4 that attacks norm n1.
5 Related Work
One of the most well-known scheme-based approach in prac-
tical reasoning is [Atkinson and Bench-Capon, 2007]. Re-
cently, [Oren, 2013] has proposed a similar scheme-based ap-
proach for normative practical reasoning, but unlike [Atkin-
son and Bench-Capon, 2007] arguments are constructed for
a sequence of actions rather than every single action. As a
result the schemes are simpler. Similar to the latter approach,
in this paper, arguments are constructed for plans rather than
actions. [Oren, 2013] assumes that the conflicts within and
between goals and norms are inferred from paths, rather than
being formulated at the formal model level. Thus, although
it is possible to explain why a path is more preferred over
another one, it is not possible to underpin why a path does
not satisfy a goal or violate a norm. In contrast, we explicitly
concern ourselves with why the agent does not satisfy a goal
or violate a norm. In addition, in this work the explanation
of justifiability of why a plan is (one of) the best plan(s) for
the agent to execute is formulated using a dialogue game for
preferred semantics.
There are few applications of dialogue games that use the
dialogues for explanation purposes [Zhong et al., 2014; Fan
and Toni, 2015; Caminada et al., 2014b]. In [Zhong et al.,
2014] and [Fan and Toni, 2015] admissible dispute trees de-
veloped for Assumption-based Argumentation [Dung et al.,
2009] are used to provide explanation for why a certain deci-
sion is better than another one. In [Caminada et al., 2014b] a
dialogical proof procedure based on the grounded semantics
dialogue game [Caminada and Podlaszewski, 2012] is created
to justify the actions executed in a plan. Despite the popu-
larity of the preferred semantics, they have not been used in
applications in the past. Our work proposes a concrete ap-
plication of preferred dialogue games in a practical reasoning
domain.
6 Conclusion and Future Work
Argumentation has been used to study practical reason-
ing and decision-making in the past [Zhong et al., 2014;
Rahwan and Amgoud, 2006; Amgoud and Prade, 2009;
Oren, 2013]. In contrast to existing approaches, we propose
a framework that integrates the reasoning and dialogical as-
pects of argumentation to undertake normative practical rea-
soning. The question of how should an agent act in a nor-
mative environment while it has conflicting goals and norm
is answered using argumentation-based reasoning. More-
over, the question of how can the agent can generate expla-
nation for why it acted a certain way, is answered using an
argumentation-based dialogue.
In the current approach the conflict within goals and be-
tween goals and norms is addressed trivially. Similar to con-
flicts between norms, these two types of conflicts can be ad-
dressed temporally, hence enriching the conflict detection.
This is left for future work. Another interesting direction of
future work is testing empirically if providing explanation, in
particular in natural language, in practical reasoning domain
raises the likelihood of human users accepting the recommen-
dation of the system regarding the best plan(s).
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